29/11/01:
workshop planning's response to diversity in the city
To Mix or
not to mix? Housing policies in the U.S.A, Sweden and the Netherlands
Are people entitled to live, where they want to
live?
Text: Lex Veldboer, Reinout Kleinhans, Jan
Willem Duyvendak
Presentation: Reinout Kleinhans
Introduction
Diversification
politics are high on the list of priorities in several Western countries. In
most of these countries mixed neighbourhoods are propagated as the solution for
(the threat of) problems of ethnic concentration and segregation. Assumed is
that concentrations have a 'weakening' effect on the residents and produce high
social costs. The underlying idea is that isolation is an obstacle for
integration. Although the degree of 'one group' concentration differs strongly
between the Western countries, blending is almost everywhere seen as a way to
conquer integration problems. The interventions can vary from measures in the
housing stock (demolition and new construction, upgrading) to offering opportunities
to remove or even dispersal policies.
The idea to mix established and 'marginal'
groups is almost everywhere welcomed, also among the general public.
(Established and vulnerable groups have both the conviction that mixing is
necessary and profitable: people should live together regardless of their
background. Only then they can get to learn each other or even become like each
other. This might sound beautiful,) but when it comes to practice there is a
lot of opposition to mixing. Because diversification politics directly
influence the position of individual households, all kinds of emotions in
'receiving' or dispersed neighbourhoods are visible. A well-known critique is
that mixing breaks up existing communities and that intermingling could even
disturb social peace. So the question is, is mixing really a high-potential
strategy? Is it really leading to integration? We will try to make clear that
hesitations are justified. Enforcing mixed neighbourhoods is in our view not in
all circumstances the best possible solution. Sometimes you have to look at
other ways to respond to ethno-culturallly diverse urban environments.
In this short presentation we try to compare
the problems and the physical solutions regarding concentrations of minorities
for three nations: the United States, the Netherlands and Sweden. Comparing
America with Europe is - of course - a tricky job. On the other hand: a
comparison can illustrate quite well that mixing is very much related to
national and local contexts. The opportunities to guide peoples' residential
behaviour are very different. In the States the concept of laisser faire
dominates strongly also in housing. This has led to serious forms of
segregation. In Europe these 'American' types of mono-ethnic concentration are yet
absent. Partly this is due to the tradition of government interventions in
housing policies. But also the political beliefs and traditions related to the
theme of multiculturalism, play a role in this.
The
United States
We start on the other side of the ocean. The
U.S. are the immigrant country par excellence and most American cities are
ethnically and culturally very diverse. Black and whites, Latino's and Asians
and all kinds of subcategories are substantially present in the metropolitan
areas. At the same time residential separation and even segregation are part of
the common big city pattern. Black ghetto's are the clearest example of
segregation. Research shows that living in these areas negatively influences
the opportunities of inhabitants in an extra way. These ghetto's are on the
hand the consequence of the big socio-economic differences in the States that
are copied on the housing market: private home-ownership is common and public
housing is primarily concentrated in a few cities. Poor blacks are thrown on
these public housing projects-areas.
But these black concentrations are also the
result of group preferences. If groups are asked to define their position
vis-ā-vis each other, blacks are consistently perceived in unfavourable terms.
They are the least preferred groups of neighbours (out of fear for
neighbourhood decline). Whites are the most favoured out-groups, but mostly
they are not very open for intermingling: they score the highest percentage in
the preference for same-race neighbourhoods. Certainly white homeowners with
children are not very inclined to live in racially mixed neighbourhoods.
Not surprisingly, the 'moving to opportunity
programs' (programs that enable people to 'escape' to better parts of the city)
that were launched in the late nineties, had to encounter resistance from
middle class communities who feared an upsurge of social problems. Black
participants in these relatively small diversification programs on the other
hand were satisfied. They had more contacts with whites and their position
improved due to the better services (schools, jobs) in the suburbs they went
to.
Not only American policymakers 'dream' of
social mixing. Architects from the New Urbanism school of thought, have in the
past years tried to develop suburbs that were more open to social interaction
and to social diversification. They have indeed succeeded to make suburbs that
are less sleepy, but the element of social diversification is not worked out
very serious. Public housing plays in their plans only a very minor role.
Although there is a lot of rhetoric's, mixing
is not a big thing in America. The American sensitivity for class and race
issues might be extremely high, but the actual opportunities for reversing
destructive forms of - mostly involuntary
- segregation are due to the market
context, very limited.
But let's keep in mind that not all ethnic
concentrations in the States are the natural outcome of economic differences,
(subtle) exclusion and lack of choice. On the contrary, there are many
neighbourhoods with a strong and proud identity (Chinatowns, Little Italies,
gay districts, Hispanic neighbourhoods). The ingroup attachments in those areas
are strong and positively rewarded, both by insiders and outsiders (who enjoy
the charm of such a 'different' surrounding). These profiled settlements
correspond with the predominant concept of multiculturalism in the U.S.
Cultural, ethnic or religious based groups are entitled to have room,
figuratively as well as literally, to manifest themselves. This idea of a salad
bowl of communities (that is even stronger visible for America's neighbour:
Canada), allows different groups to follow their own preferences in housing.
These differences are mostly positively rewarded. If people choose to live apart,
and they can afford it, then they are free to do so.
Sweden
We now switch our view to
Europe, to Sweden. For a long period of history Sweden has been a relatively
homogeneous country with a lot of state intervention and social engineering.
Traditionally most immigrants were labour searching Finns. In the seventies a
group of Chilean refugees arrived in Sweden and they were followed by other
Latin American groups. In the nineties a new wave followed with refugees from
Turkey, Iran, former Yugoslavia and Somalia.
In 1996 17% of the inhabitants of greater
Stockholm (1,7 mln. people), were born outside Sweden. Immigrant-settlement is
especially visible in the city-regions that are dominated by social rental
housing. Most of the immigrants live in the
so called Million Housing areas. (Suburban areas that - ironically - were
created to dwell different household categories and income groups, in order to
favour good social relations and prevent socio-economic segregation.
In real life these
areas weren't very popular among Swedes and this has led to a process of
selective migrations (Swedish out, immigrants in). The clearest example is the Rinkeby-district. This district had in the
mid-nineties (by far) the highest percentage of immigrants (61%) in the city.
Typical for those areas is not so much the domination of one ethnic group, but
the relative absence of Swedish-born residents.
Another typical feature
is that Stockholm is not for all immigrant groups the most important place of
settlement. The rate of Iranian-born persons in the city is relatively low as a
consequence of the dispersal policy that was implemented in 1985 at the time
that refugee-migration from Iran was at its greatest. This dispersal policy has
also kept the amount of Yugoslav-born inhabitants relatively low. This so
called "Whole-of Sweden" policy, meaning that all newly arrived immigrants were
spread over the country by the government to avoid concentrations in the major
cities, has kept on for ten years. The results were not as long-lasting as was
expected. After 1995, immigrants were allowed to decide for themselves where
they want to live. As a result, more refugees moved to Stockholm and other
cities in the hope to find jobs
Another strategy in the
mid-eighties to avoid concentrations was to initiate large-scale restructuring
projects in the most problematic areas (read: the areas with ethnic
concentrations). The intention was "to attract more middle and higher income
people to settle in polarised areas" (Öresjö, 1995). Despite protests against
the demolition of the blocks and the following mostly involuntarily removal of
low income groups, the restructuring proceeded. Later research showed that the
main effect was that social problems became relocated, but not solved.
Problematic households didn't improve their behaviour in a new
surrounding.)
In
the nineties there was a new attempt to stimulate intermingling via housing. In
Rinkeby the most 'foreign' part of Stockholm, the local housing corporation
determined that newly arriving immigrants should be excluded and formulated a
maximum percentage for the share of immigrants (so the attempt to mix was
explicitly in terms of ethnicity). In order to reach this target, the housing
corporation attempted selective distribution of vacant dwellings. Despite these
drastic measures, the diversification goals were not achieved: the local
population was unwilling to co operate with it. Ergo, the attempts to speed up integration via dispersal
policies and mixed housing projects, were in the end not very successful. Mixed
neighbourhoods were difficult to force or couldn't make the difference.
A harsh conclusion,
certainly for a country with a strong egalitarian and homogeneous tradition. An
economic crisis (early '90's) and
racist incidents, made that Sweden went through a debate on the meaning of a
multi-ethnic society; (Jederlund, 1998). It resulted in a new focus: to integrate the 'new Swedes', underdeveloped
neighbourhoods should not be mixed, but first socially improved. The interventions are now aimed at
economic participation, and the sharing of a common language and a set of legal
norms. This should result in equal access to common meeting places and to every
neighbourhood.
Ideas as respect for
different ethnic and social backgrounds, bilingualism and the wish of some
groups to live in segmented areas are officially not neglected (Westin, 1997),
but the strong egalitarian traditions make it difficult to allow groups to be
different and to find places to be different. The construction of mosques is an illustration of
this: it has been very difficult for Muslims in many
municipalities to find land for their mosques. After lengthy negotiations,
however, a mosque will soon be built in Stockholm. A more figuratively struggle
takes place on the school issue - a conflict that doesn't only effect Muslims
-. The fact that private schools do not fit well into Swedish educational
traditions sets backs, though, the development of migrant or religious schools
(Runblom, 1998).
The Netherlands
Finally the Netherlands. Like
Sweden, the Netherlands has traditionally engaged in high levels of state
intervention in residential policy and emphasised the importance of equal
opportunities. Although the Netherlands now has more privately-owned than
rental houses, in the big cities the rental sector - generally managed by
housing corporations - is still by far the most important element of the local
housing market.
While the Netherlands has enjoyed
high levels of economic prosperity, many observers are worried about the fact
not all social groups have benefited equally from the new prosperity. Particularly
among (the children of) Turkish and Moroccan labour immigrants, classic
underdevelopment problems remain. This concern has also affected the
area of housing. In 1995, the government's most important research agency wrote
that "ingredients for marginalisation, geographical segregation and the
emergence of a culture of poverty are present" (SCP, 1995, translation ours). And the big cities also expressed their concern about the growing differences between poor and
rich neighbourhoods and about the emergence of 'white' and 'black' schools.
During the
second half of the 1990s, the Dutch government initiated a Grotestedenbeleid (Major Cities Policy) that involved various
sectoral efforts to improve the conditions for the 'underprivileged' living in
depressed neighbourhoods. This Major Cities Policy also promotes
diversification of population on neighbourhood level, aimed at integration in
both social and economic terms. To achieve diversification of the housing
supply in 'unbalanced areas' the policy of most cities is to eliminate a great
deal of the surplus of cheap rental homes and rebuild more expensive houses
instead, furthermore rental homes are sold and relatively expensive rental
homes are restored. It is argued that the attracted middle-and higher-income
groups may serve as social and economic 'role models' for weaker groups.
Sociologists and social-geographers
doubt whether uniformity in Dutch
neighbourhoods is really as excessive and economically negative as claimed
(Musterd et al. 1999; Van Kempen, 1997). According to academics, the Dutch
situation is by far not comparable to the U.S ghetto's. They also doubt
whether diversification produces more
intense social relations. Research shows that forced mixing mostly does not
lead to intermingling. Although physical distances are small, social distances
are still clear. A newly forced mix is likely to result in a form of 'living
apart together' and could even lead to new tensions (Kleinhans, Veldboer en
Duyvendak, 2000).
Surprisingly
enough, this criticism was taken seriously by politicians, at least by liberals
who considered programs forcing people to live together as a form of social
engineering they could not approve of. In a new policy memorandum was stated
that neighbourhoods with an average population are not automatically the most
'liveable' neighbourhoods. And it was argued that "a uniform social or cultural
structure of neighbourhoods or districts is only a problem if it is
involuntary or due to a lack of choice" (VROM, 2000, p. 176; translation ours.)
As a
consequence policymakers now take closer looks. If they are really dealing with
neighbourhoods where people involuntary live together - because of lack of
opportunities to settle elsewhere-, then mixing is a serious option. All
parties involved (including immigrants) seem to agree that diversification
measures in these circumstances are necessary and urgent. For example
immigrant resident organisations in Utrecht have pleaded explicitly for living
in a more socially diversified environment. They reasoned that a stigmatised
neighbourhood is a setback for underprivileged groups (Lange & Vloet,
2000).
For whom to built new houses
is nowadays, however, highly controversial. In some districts the goal remains
to attract more well to do people (read: white people) to come to live in poor
neighbourhoods (read: black neighbourhoods). But also other choices are made
nowadays. In some districts new, privately owned houses are meant for people
already living in those neighbourhoods (social climbers) and furthermore, in
some districts the ethnic or cultural identity/identities are the basis for
plans for renewal (plans for a Mediterranean neighbourhood). Dutch diversification
politics nowadays shows different faces. From statistically balanced
neighbourhoods versus districts that have profiled 'identities'.
In official terms the Dutch policy is to focus more on opportunities and
choice and less on results (in terms of heterogeneous or homogeneous
neighbourhoods). Opinion leaders in the public debate, however still make
strong calls for heterogeneous schools and neighbourhoods in order to stimulate
the cultural and economic integration of migrants. Mixing should lead to better
inter-ethnic relations or even assimilation. In public opinion the slogan is to
'come together'. Ethnic profiles in housing, on schools etc. are rejected:
migrants should live among the Dutch majority and should give up a great deal
of their cultural identity.
Programs
aiming at neighbourhood restructuring will continue in the Netherlands, but
consensus is lacking why and whereto. Divergence in opinions regarding the
future of the Dutch multicultural society are mirrored in disagreements on
housing policies.
This brings us to the concluding remarks
Mixing neighbourhoods is
a popular answer towards the growing diversity in western cities. Creating
diversified neighbourhoods has already attention in the construction phase and
later on, via mobility programmes, dispersal strategies, restructuring and -ethnic-
quotum policies. Diversification of the population should prevent and solve problems related to education and work,
social understanding and social peace. For the American situation mixing could
be a promising instrument in terms of economic integration (living in ghetto's
is definitely a setback for
opportunities). But there are not enough tools to realise mixing. In Europe
there is no lack of tools (Sweden is the clearest example), but there are few
results so far. Mixed housing seems in the European context less decisive for
social-economic and social-cultural integration as was expected. Concentrations
are less extreme and (due to the welfare state) less negative as in America. But
the European formal solidarity between established and marginal groups doesn't
imply informal solidarity: mixed housing does not lead to mixed living. The
ambitions for this type of social engineering have (had) unrealistic social
overtones.
The term diversification politics might suggest
that mixing is part of a diversity-policy. In the sense that variety in the
housing stock of an area could be seen as a way to respect differences between
and in between groups. But constructing
'average neighbourhoods', composed of many groups, proportional to their
presence in the population at large, can also be seen as a strategy to diminish
diversity. Certainly in Sweden there are strong hesitations towards a
too heterogeneous society. Immigrants should be surrounded by Swedes and should
become Swedes, is more or less the official egalitarian line. Allowing 'new Swedes' to be different is rather opposed
than stimulated. Also the Netherlands are sensitive for 'too much'
distinction. Certainly in the public eye mixing is still seen as a way to make
the society culturally more homogeneous. To put it in other words: mixing is in
the dominant (Northwest) European perspective more likely a monocultural
strategy, then a multicultural strategy.
For multicultural diversity strategies, the
American housing context offers more room than the Netherlands and (certainly)
Sweden. In the U.S. there is less fear for inequality and for cultural
differences. The wish among some immigrants to live in segmented areas, in
communities with a specific identity ('a home away from home') is easier
accepted in the States. As long as they can afford it, the choice who to live
with, is up to the people themselves and not to the government. The U.S. is in
this sense the true champion of diversity-politics, but also the champion
regarding racial segregation.
Jan Willem Duyvendak: studied sociology and
philosophy. Now professor of community studies at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam and director of the Verwey Jonker Institute for social studies in
Utrecht. His research is related to different kinds of social engineering on
the (sub)local level. Related to diversity there are several studies to
mention: on Diversification politics in schools, sport and housing (integration
attempts via all kinds of mixing); and furthermore on preventive policies
towards youth criminality (the return of 'caring' or 'pedagogic' paternalism
especially towards migrants). He is a member of the 'visitation comity' for the
Dutch Major Cities Policy.
Lex Veldboer: studied political science. Now
researcher in the field of community studies at the EUR. Deals with the same
topics as Jan Willem Duyvendak. At the moment he is looking for trends in
social work. He worked between 1996 and 1998 as a policymaker for the
municipality of Amsterdam (social policy towards drugusers, homeless people
etc.).
Reinout Kleinhans:
studied social geography. Now junior researcher at the OTB research
institute for housing, urban and mobility studies at the Delft University of
Technology. As an expert on the terrain of housing he worked with Duyvendak and
Veldboer on the topic of social effects of diversification politics.
Extra
references (Sweden)
Hjärne,
L. (1994), Experiences from mixed housing in Sweden (short note). In: Scandinavian Housing & Planning Research,
vol. 11, pp. 253-257.
Jederlund, L. (1998), Current Sweden: from
Immigration Policy to Integration Policy. Swedish Institute, no. 422, December
1998 (http://www.si.se/infoSweden/594.cs?).
Musterd, S., Ostendorf, W. & M. Breebaart,
(1998), Multi-Ethnic Metropolis: Patters
and Policies. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
Runblom, H. (1998), Current Sweden: Sweden as a
Multicultural Society. Swedish Institute, no. 418, April 1998
(http://www.si.se/infoSweden/588.cs?)
Swedish Institute, (1999), Immigrants in
Sweden. In: Fact Sheets on Sweden, FS 63 y Ohd, April 1999, Uppsala (http://www.si.se).
Swedish Institute, (2000), Housing and Housing
Policy in Sweden. In: Fact Sheets on Sweden, FS 84 m Ohc, Oktober 2000, Uppsala
(http://www.si.se).
