METROPOLIS INTER CONFERENCE -
International Conference on Divided Cities and Strategies for Undivided Cities,
Göteborg, Sweden, May 25 - 26, 1998

Tenants’ Participation and Empowerment in
Social Housing Improvement Schemes; Myths and Facts in France

Maurice Blanc
Lastes
Université Nancy 2
BP 33-97
54015 Nancy
France
Tel: +33 3 83 96 70 23
Fax +33 3 83 96 70 19
E-mail:blanc@clsh.u-nancy.fr

Revised version (September 1998) of a paper presented at the Metropolis Inter Conference : Divided Cities and Strategies for Undivided Cities, Göteborg, Sweden, 25-26 May 1998

Introduction & Abstract

In social housing improvement schemes, tenants’ participation is a key issue. Whether French or foreigners, they should become active citizens at the neighbourhood level. But, very often what is done is far from what is said. The paper offers, first, a definition of an ethnic minority neighbourhood in which various ethnic groups live together with the local poor. Then, it describes two distinct patterns of ethnic minority settlement. The first one is the classical inner-city slum area, until the 1960s, with exclusion from social housing as a consequence. The second pattern emerged by the mid 1970s. As a consequence of urban renewal and gentrification on the one hand, and of social housing high-rise estate dilapidation, on the other, ethnic minorities and the poor are now concentrated in these devalued suburbs.

The process of social housing regeneration is critically assessed, pointing out some discrepancies between aims and results. A special emphasis is placed on the effects on ethnic minorities but the aim is definitely not to disassociate ethnic minorities from other tenants (the ethnic majority). The conclusion shows how tenants’ participation raises major issues on democracy and it suggests urban planning requires democratic competencies for structuring a productive public debate in an intercultural context.

What is an « ethnic minorities neighbourhood ? »

In French, the usual term immigré (immigrant, but with a more passive connotation) is very ambiguous. First, not all foreigners are immigrés. This term includes a second connotation of social class : the immigrant is seen as a poor and low qualified worker. This representation persists, despite the development of an « ethnic petite bourgeoisie ». Reversibly, not all immigrés are foreigners. With the so-called « second generation » born in France, immigrés are increasingly French nationals with foreign parents. Furthermore, the term immigré is both applicable to the temporary migration of young and healthy single workers (the famous « guest » workers) and to the permanent settlement of workers with their families. They must be disassociated when dealing with housing issues.

The concept "ethnic minority" appears more appropriate in describing these populations characterised by their physical appearance (Rex, 1986). However, most French researchers are very reluctant to use it. As a matter of fact, « ethnic » is often a euphemism for « racial ». Furthermore, no ethnic data is available, the French Constitution and the Data Protection Bill strictly forbid any recording of data on race, ethnicity and/or religion. The only data available, the distribution according to nationality, is not very relevant here : foreigners are some 7 percent of the French population but this tells us nothing about either ethnic minorities or immigrés.

In France, ethnic minorities come from two main sources, either from former colonies, first of all from North Africa, (the post-colonial pattern) or from neighbouring countries, Italy, Spain, Portugal, (the latter now constitutes the largest group of foreigners in France). They have a different housing situation which can be explained in terms of historical causes.

During the post-war period of economic growth, it was rather easy to enter illegally, to get a job and then an administrative regularisation of the situation. At a first stage, most migrants shared the same substandard housing conditions in slums, sometimes in bidonvilles (shanty towns). But a differentiation quickly appeared. Migrants from neighbouring countries were predominantly coming with their families and better housing was a big concern. North Africans were predominantly temporary workers coming alone and leaving their families at home. Their main concern was to save as much as they could and to send money to their families. Better housing implied paying more and, therefore, it was a low priority. The word « ghetto » is often used but it is misleading because it suggests ethnic homogeneity. The neighbourhood is poor but it includes members of the « ethnic majority » and various ethnic minorities.

Among the consequences of the 1974 economic crisis, the ban on new immigration is a major one. It is now strictly controlled and entrance is not allowed to any new job seeker. Illegal immigration is harder and extremely difficult to regularise afterwards. Only families joining their heads already working in France are allowed to enter under two conditions : a regular job and « decent » housing. This had totally unexpected consequences on social housing. Mainly Algerian workers, previously shuttling between their jobs in France and their families on the other side of the Mediterranean sea, sent for their families to come over and live with them in France. They applied for social housing which was happily allocated to them in vacant and undesirable flats. Large suburban social housing estates are now the major ethnic minority neighbourhoods.

Social Housing and Ethnic Minorities

Historically, social housing has three origins : the need to supply cheap housing to a work force required by local industries, the settlement of the homeless and assistance to the poor. Thus, there is an ambiguity, still present today, in the functions of social housing : Should it house the poorest, or only the « deserving poor » ? Even if they do not look for profit, the managers of social housing organisations must balance their income and their expenditures and they tend to prefer solvent tenants who can afford their rents. When « social » implies housing for the poor, « real » social housing used to be from the sub-standard private stock.

From Exclusion to Concentration of Ethnic Minorities

Most of the French social housing stock was built in the 1950s and 1960s on high-rise peripheral estates. As a consequence of the existing housing crisis, these new and modern housing units attracted « middle-class » households (i.e., skilled workers, junior public servants, etc). Most of them were expecting to move within a couple of years to a better housing situation (usually, home ownership).

Traditionally, ethnic minorities have experienced great difficulty in accessing social housing because it is not allocated to single workers and the families do not know about their right to it. Social housing is not adapted to the size of their families and, de facto, priority is given to the natives. Social housing also means a waiting list when an immediate solution is necessary. Minorities « choose » sub-standard private housing because it is immediately available.

In the 1950s and 1960s, urban « renewal » policies erased inner-city slums. In most cases, low income households were offered re-housing on social housing peripheral estates. Some of them were happy to move into better housing but others considered this transfer as « deportation ». Whether pleased with it or not, a vast majority was « trapped » in social housing because no other housing was affordable to them. This is a distinctive difference between the French and US patterns; « problem neighbourhoods » no longer tend to be in the inner-city but on the periphery.

The Dilapidation Process

The situation very quickly worsened in the 1970s for the following main reasons : (1) The quick dilapidation and dereliction of social housing made of cheap industrialised buildings. (2) The new central government policy encouraging « upper lower-classes » to become owners of single family homes. Social housing tenants who used to regularly pay their rents moved out for home ownership. On social housing estates with a bad reputation, vacancies appeared and steadily increased. (3) The 1973 oil and economic crisis. Unemployment hit first unskilled workers and, consequently, low income social housing tenants. Many of them could no longer afford to pay their rent. With the increase in demand from ethnic minorities applying for family regrouping, the population of devalued social housing estates became a combination of poverty with ethnicity.

Vacancies were a great concern for social housing managers who could neither reimburse their debts nor pay for repairs, so that dilapidated estates rapidly tended to become more and more dilapidated, initiating a vicious circle :

dilapidation--> vacancy-->more dilapidation-->more vacancy, etc.

By the mid 1970s, social housing organisations turned to the central government for help, first for financial reasons, but also for social reasons : They were afraid of concentrating the poor in devalued social housing which was contrary to their aim of contributing to social integration through decent housing.

The Aims of Social Housing Regeneration Strategies

In 1977, a conservative government decided to launch an experimental regeneration programme in fifty « disadvantaged » neighbourhoods. For some twenty years, the successive governments have agreed on the legitimacy of such an intervention. The real issue was and still is : « What is the adequate policy and how should it be implemented ? ». Many discrepancies appear between the announced aims and the effective results (see below).

The 1977 Regeneration Strategy

The initial experimental programme, called Habitat et vie sociale (HVS, or housing and community life), was grounded on the following assumptions :

a) Regeneration is for present tenants and not against them.

The required improvements are very expensive and they will necessarily be the source of rent increases. Low income tenants will be eligible for a new housing benefit called Aide personnalisée au logement (APL, or personalised housing benefit), securing them against the risk of eviction. An explicit aim of this housing improvement strategy is not to force anyone to move out of the regenerated neighbourhood. However, this explicit aim is often purely cosmetic.

b) Improving housing is not enough.

One of the requirements is to promote community life and to build a positive neighbourhood identity. Improving relations among ethnic communities is a major issue. Tenants’ participation is also a crucial condition for success. Willingness to admit tenants into the decision-making process is one eligibility criterion in the selection of competing HVS projects. However, this willingness is hard to assess by central government senior officers selecting projects. What is announced is not always what will be done.

c) Neighbourhood initiatives need support.

Initiatives dealing with some of the neighbourhood problems, such as the lack of social and cultural facilities, unemployment and training, criminality, etc., should be eligible for financial support from the HVS programme. Ethnic minorities' specific needs are eligible, but authorities are very reluctant when facing claims for a mosque, for example.

The 1982 New Policy

In 1981, the new socialist government had to face serious problems in one of the biggest high-rise social housing estates in the Lyon suburbs. The result was the launching of a more ambitious programme called Développement social des quartiers (DSQ, or social development of communities and/or neighbourhoods). It was grounded on a critical assessment of the HVS programme as globally successful in improving housing but, in most cases, unable to change community life and to associate tenants to its implementation. This new programme intended to be innovative in three main directions :

1. The fight against unemployment is a number one priority

For the long-term unemployed, single mothers and teenagers dropping out of school, how to survive is a more important issue than better housing conditions. Emphasis is put on self-help initiatives creating jobs at a neighbourhood level, combining two aims : a decrease in local unemployment and better services provided for the community.

2. A new local-central government « partnership »

The DSQ started when decentralisation laws were adopted in France. The DSQ was then expected to build new forms of partnership between local and central authorities. But, in the absence of agreed rules on who is now responsible for what, it proved extremely difficult to implement (see below).

3. A new public-private partnership

The public sector alone cannot fight against unemployment. Therefore, the DSQ is open to partnership agreements with firms willing to settle in the area and give priority to local residents in recruiting their work force, with professional training institutions giving job seekers the required skills, with individual or small groups trying to create their own jobs in the neighbourhood, etc. Her, too, the target is hard to reach (see below).

The Next Significant Changes

In the past fifteen years, the DSQ programme has known many cosmetic amendments, but the global strategy is not much altered. Two main changes need to be mentioned in this overview :

1. From DSQ to DSU

In 1988, the DSQ was renamed Développement social urbain (DSU, or social and urban development). A first institutional reason was to unite in the same administration various specific programmes dealing with youth crime, culture and architecture, etc., in order to improve administrative co-ordination and obtain a global and coherent project at the local level.

The second reason was to overcome the limits of a neighbourhood based approach. You cannot fight unemployment at the neighbourhood level only, it is not a relevant scale because the unemployed may be interested in a job in another part of the city, as long as it is of easy access for them. For this reason, the DSU is trying to work on links and exchanges between neighbourhoods. Another limit of a neighbourhood based approach is the emergence of a « perverse effect » : The more you do for a disadvantaged neighbourhood, the more you reinforce its bad reputation and stigmatisation.

2. From DSU to « Contrat de ville »

The next step was to replace the DSU with the present procedure, called Contrat de ville (« City agreement »). It is also a way to point out the limits of a neighbourhood based approach and to emphasise the need for a strategy at city level in order to improve the « disadvantaged » neighbourhoods. « City » means here a conurbation, usually made of various elected municipalities forming a loose federation. Disputes among municipalities are frequent and they experience serious difficulties before agreeing on a Contrat de ville.

The present government has placed this policy under review. From what leaked out in the press, only one of the proposals under consideration may introduce major changes. It goes much beyond the regeneration of « disadvantaged » neighbourhoods, as it proposes to replace the existing federation of municipalities in an urban area with a strong metropolitan government which would receive its legitimacy from a direct election by citizens. This proposal is politically explosive and it will not be adopted in the near future.

Local Implementation

Every local situation is specific and it is a challenge to present a global overview. The period considered is restricted to the late 1970s and the 1980s, some evidence being available. Although the focus is on the role of tenants’ participation in the process, some ambiguities of the regeneration policy as a whole must first be taken into account.

The « Hidden Agenda » and Its Paradox

Although it is not openly admitted, many local authorities and housing managers expect the regenerated neighbourhood to become attractive again for middle-class tenants and the aim is a better « sociological balance » of the population. Housing managers pretend these new better-off tenants will receive actual empty flats but low income tenants perceive it as a strategy aimed excluding them from the improved neighbourhood and they are very reluctant, of course, to enter into the participation process. Although it has never been openly acknowledged, a better sociological balance means, in most cases, fewer ethnic groups.

Ironically, the implementation of the APL housing benefit provokes the failure of this strategy. As a matter of fact, tenants eligible for APL have had no (or very little) rent increase after the rehabilitation of their dwellings. But, low income tenants are eligible only and others have had rent increases up to 30-40 %, placing rents at the same level as in better neighbourhoods. Improving housing conditions is definitely not enough for changing the neighbourhood's bad reputation and a vast majority of these tenants prefer to move out than to pay more. The APL was created for fighting segregation. Its unintended effect has been to increase it. Only low income tenants stay, by constraint and not by choice, in regenerated social housing neighbourhoods. Ethnic minorities are doing exactly as any other tenant, they tend to move out when their income is higher. They stay when they are « trapped », but it does not prevent them from creating their specific networks.

Participation and Power

There is a need for the clarification and definition of what participation means. Arnstein’s (1971) famous « ladder of participation » distinguishes nine rungs but the central distinction is between consultation and negotiation. Consultation is a top-down process in which local authorities invite the population to react to their plans but, in the end, they are the only ones to make the final decision. Of course, when tenants enter into the participation process, they do not want to simply express their views, they want to influence the final decision. In other words, they want a negotiation and their empowerment is a prerequisite. Power holders (local authorities, housing managers, experts and professionals) are reluctant to admit a redistribution of power which reduces their own.

1. Tenants' and Workers’ Participation

The comparison with workers’ participation in industry illuminates the ambiguities of the process. Employers promote workers’ participation as long as it improves the production process. They are not in favour of an industrial democracy leading to self-management and a reduction of their authority. But, these two aspects cannot be disassociated. Employers frequently hesitate and change their minds when participation becomes « too political », but they cannot fully dismiss it when efficiency is at stake.

The same occurs with local authorities and housing managers considering tenants’ participation. They would appreciate a constructive contribution of tenants expressing their views, but they are afraid of their empowerment. Notwithstanding some remarkable exceptions (see below), most local authorities introduce some form of token participation because they are required to do so, but they do their best to avoid the introduction of tenants into the real decision-making process.

2. Public Authorities' Ambiguities

On the one hand, central government encourages local authorities to introduce some form of participative management, but without any definition of what participation is and with no control of its implementation. It is a moral exhortation and not a policy.

On the other hand, local authorities are very reluctant to introduce tenants’ participation. With some good reason, most of them see participation as a waste of time, producing conflicts and no consensus. At a deeper level, many councillors object to the legitimacy of participation. They have been elected for making decisions on behalf of the citizens and it would be unfair to introduce un-elected tenants (and often opponents) into the decision-making process. Representative democracy is at stake.

Ethnic minorities usually experience how difficult it is to express one’s views in front of a not very friendly audience. Participation creates double bind situations in which tenants are trapped because they are invited to speak but they are immediately interrupted because they raise issues which are not on the agenda, etc. They quickly understand that participation meetings are a waste of time and the failure of participation becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Symmetrically, local authorities are also trapped. When they advocate tenants’ participation, they are accused of delaying an unpopular decision and when they make a decision they are accused of being authoritarian.

3. Claimed Vs Granted Participation

The pattern described above is the most common but, in some cases and at a given time, tenants' input has been taken into account. It has occurred where tenants have been organised in associations before the launching of a housing improvement scheme and have already been demanding improved housing conditions. The selection of their neighbourhood into the regeneration programme is then perceived as their victory : Central government acknowledges the legitimacy of our claims. Tenant organisations send the following message : « We have now got a first victory but we must keep active. We must ensure that they do what we want and not what they have decided. So we must be present ».

This claim for more participation from mobilised tenants is full of confict but productive. Ironically, authorities are afraid of it and, when they offer tenants the chance to participate, their hope is to dilute their mobilisation. As a matter of fact, there is no participation without mobilisation and « granted » participation does not work, as seen in the usual pattern.

Conclusions

I cannot offer any examples of « good practice » which could be imitated in Sweden or elsewhere. I do believe every local situation is specific and that good practice in a given context cannot be duplicated in another one. As a conclusion, I shall first point out how tenants’ participation is a democratic challenge for everyone at the local level. I shall then emphasise the need for planners to develop new professional competencies, such as translation and mediation.

Participation and Democracy

Participation involves tenants as users of given goods, such as housing, neighbourhood infrastructures, etc., but also as citizens who have to determine at a local level what their « common good » is. Therefore, democracy is the key issue.

1. Participation Vs Representation

The classical theory of representative democracy restricts citizenship to the right to vote (Schumpeter, 1943). Democratically elected representatives have the legitimacy to make decisions and, when citizens are not satisfied with what they do, they (s)elect new representatives next time. For the theory of participative democracy, on the other hand, citizens, through the act of participation, learn to be able to be more active and thus develop a real sense of community (Pateman, 1970).

The weakness of each theory is the strength of the other but they tend to exclude each other. The legitimacy of elected representatives tends to consider the direct intervention of citizens as illegitimate and vice versa. These conflicting principles of legitimacy cannot be reconciled, they can only be accommodated through a pragmatic compromise which does not solve the tension. In other words, grassroots democracy as an attempt to combine the direct intervention of citizens with the action of politicians is a social transaction process in which there is both co-operation and conflict (Smith & Blanc, 1997).

2. A Local Public Space for Debate

Participation requires citizens to express their needs and their views of their common future, but this is not enough. Citizens must also listen to others : neighbours with a distinct ethnicity and different needs, local authorities, experts, etc. Participation is then a mutual learning process in which conflicts do not disappear but they are openly expressed and taken into account. At a local level, a « public space for debate » (Habermas, 1986) has to be created.

3. Participation and Mediation

Simply inviting residents of a neighbourhood to participate is not enough. Low income tenants and/or ethnic minorities usually face difficulties in expressing their views in front of authorities. In the game of participation, the stronger and better organised are likely to gain the prize. Therefore, there is a need for a committed mediator whose job is to redress the balance (he/she might be called a « smuggler »). Such mediators may emerge among local residents and some ethnic minorities' activists are excellent in this function. However, mediation tends to become a professional matter.

Planners and Participation

In the traditional pattern of local democracy, planners are supposed to give only expert advice to elected councillors who will, alone, make a legitimate decision. In reality, when it comes to complex issues, planners play, in most cases, a major role and strongly influence the final output because they have the technical expertise.

The real decision-making process is a « bipolar social transaction » between two competing principles of legitimacy, representation and expert knowledge. Participation introduces a more complex pattern, or a « tripolar social transaction », in which three principles of legitimacy are competing : representation, participation and expert knowledge. Planners, then, have a new role to play.

1. Implementing Participation

Urban planners are increasingly required to implement residents’ participation. They can do much to facilitate and organise the debate but they must adopt a « low profile » and be very modest : they cannot be « democratic » on behalf of others. Citizens and politicians are the main actors who need to come to terms.

2. Translation

As other professions, planners have their own expert language. They are used to « translate » it into plain words for politicians. But experienced politicians become « professionals » able to understand expert language. The need for translation is much more acute in the participation process in which the ordinary citizen must grasp the issues at stake. How to be simple without being simplistic ?

3. Mediation

Mediation may take many forms but, specifically in deprived neighbourhoods, planners cannot simply be a third party, neutral and non-partisan. As said above, when the inequality of position is high, there is a need for a pro-active mediator, committed to redressing the balance. Are planners willing to play this new role ?

Selected Bibliography in English

ARNSTEIN S.J., 1971, « A Ladder of Citizenship Participation », Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Vol. 35, pp. 216-224.

BLANC M., 1992, « From Substandard Housing to De-valorised Social Housing : Ethnic Minorities in Germany, France and the U.K. », European Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 3, n°1, pp. 7-23.

BLANC M., 1993, « Housing Segregation and the Poor. New Trends in French Social Rented Housing », Housing Studies, Vol. 8, n°3, pp. 207-214.

BLANC M., 1998, « Social Integration & Exclusion in France : Some Introductory Remarks from a Social Transaction Perspective », Housing Studies, (forthcoming).

BLANC M. & BERTRAND L., 1996, « The Promotion of Social Housing : France », in : Paul Balchin (ed.), Housing Policy in Europe, London, Routledge, pp. 125-145.

HABERMAS J., 1986, The Public Sphere, Boston, Ma, MIT Press.

PATEMAN C., 1970, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, University Press.

REX J., 1986, Race and Ethnicity, Milton Keynes, Open University Press.

SCHUMPETER J., 1943, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy, London, Allen & Unwin.

SIMMEL G., 1950, The Sociology of Georg Simmel, London, Collier-Macmillan (trans. & edited by Kurt Wolff).

SMITH D.M. & BLANC M., 1996, « Citizenship, Nationality & Ethnic Minorities in Three European Nations », International Journal of Urban & Regional Research, Vol. 20, pp. 66-82.

SMITH D.M. & BLANC M., 1997, « Grassroots Democracy & Participation : A New Analytical & Practical Approach », Environment & Planning D : Society & Space, Vol. 15, pp. 281-303.

APL, aide personnalisée au logement = personalised housing benefit.

DSQ, développement social des quartiers = social development of communities and/or neighbourhoods.

HVS, habitat et vie sociale = housing and community life.

Author

Maurice Blanc (1943) is a Professor of Sociology at the Nancy 2 University. He is Director of the sociological research unit (called LASTES). He teaches social sciences applied to urban planning both in the Department of Sociology and in the CUCES-Universités (i.e., the Joint Adult Education Centre of Nancy Universities). He is a member of the editorial boards of : Espaces et Sociétés and : Housing Studies. He belongs to the European Union DG-12 Working Group : « Urban Governance and Social Cohesion » (CIVITAS Programme).